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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Charles Earl Guess appeals from the district court's orders denying his
I.C. § 19-2604(1) motions for dismissal of the withheld judgment entered upon
his guilty plea to aggravated assault.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In April 2006, Guess held his wife and her divorce attorney at gunpoint,
threatened to kill both of them, and twice struck his wife in the face with his hand.
(R., vol. I, pp.23-26; PSI, pp.2-5, 7-9, 18-23,27-32.) The state charged him with
domestic battery and two counts of aggravated assault.

(R., vol. I, pp.16-17.)

Pursuant to a binding Rule 11 plea agreement, the state filed an amended
information alleging one count of aggravated assault, and Guess pled guilty to
that charge. (R., vol. I, pp.49-56.) As part of the Rule 11 agreement, the parties
stipulated that Guess "shall receive a Withheld Judgment and shall be placed on
probation to the Idaho State Department of Corrections for a period of no more
than five (5) years."

(R., vol. I, p.53.)

The district court accepted the plea

agreement and, consistent therewith, withheld judgment and placed Guess on
supervised probation for a period of five years, commencing August 31, 2006.
(R., vol. I, pp.103-11.) Guess performed well on probation and was transferred
to unsupervised status on January 27, 2011. (R., vol. II, pp.171-73.)
On September 7, 2011, Guess filed a "Motion To Dismiss Withheld
Judgment," requesting pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1) that the district court enter
an order "terminating the sentence and setting aside the guilty plea of the

1

Defendant, and finally dismissing the case and discharging the Defendant." (R.,
vol. II, pp.174-75.) In support of his motion, Guess submitted his own affidavit
and 14 letters of support. (R., vol. II, pp.176-209.) At the hearing on the motion,
Guess' ex-wife, Michele, indicated that she was still fearful of Guess and, "as a
victim, will always be in fear of Mr. Guess."

(Tr., p.55, Ls.11-24.) The state

indicated it was "not aware of any legal basis as far as a probation violation or
any noncompliance with probation on the part of Dr. Guess that would forbid him
seeking this relief' and left the decision to the court's discretion. (Tr., p.56, LS.215.) After considering all of the information before it, the district court denied the
motion without prejudice, reasoning:
Well, I would say that this is a hard case. On one side, I
have a defendant who has performed as well as any defendant I
can remember while on probation. I have thoughtful and numerous
letters from people who apparently know the defendant and can
vouch for him and his performance while on probation.
On the other side of the scale, I have what is abominable
behavior which resulted in a plea of guilty being tendered by the
defendant and a victim who is the mother of the defendant's son,
and who apparently still is in fear of the defendant. ...

I think [the prosecutor] is correct that in virtually all of these
cases in the past where I've been shown what I have been shown
in this case, I have granted the motion. I don't remember a case in
the past in which a victim testified against the motion, frankly. So,
the motion is denied without prejudice.
(Tr., p.56, L.19 - p.57, L.15.) The court's ruling was memorialized in a written
order entered on December 23,2011. (R., vol. II, pp.212-14.) In that order, the
court also purported to formally discharge Guess from probation.
p.213.)
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(R., vol. II,

On January 19, 2012, Guess filed a "Motion: (1) To Enforce Rule 11 Plea
Agreement And Order Withholding Judgment, And To Set Aside Guilty Plea,
Terminate Probation, Dismiss Action And Restore Civil Rights; Or, In The
Alternative, (2) To Clarify Order Denying Defendant's Motion To Dismiss
Withheld Judgment" (hereinafter "Motion To Enforce Rule 11 Plea Agreement")
and affidavits in support thereof.

(R, pp.218-59.) Guess argued both in his

motion and at the hearing thereon that the court was bound by the Rule 11 plea
agreement to grant an I.C. § 19-2604(1) dismissal following Guess' period of
probation.

(R, vol. II, pp.223-30, 232-38; Tr., p.15, L.15 - p.20, L.18.)

Alternatively, Guess argued that he was entitled to the requested relief because
he complied with the conditions of probation and, he contended, the requested
relief was compatible with the public interest. (R, vol. II, pp.230-32; Tr., p.10,
L.1 - p.14, L.2, p.20, L.19 - p.22, L.25.) The court rejected both arguments,
ultimately concluding that (1) nothing in the Rule 11 agreement bound the court
to grant the requested relief, and (2) in light of the victim's expressed fear of
Guess, a dismissal of the case and a restoration of his civil rights pursuant to I.C.

§ 19-2604(1) was not compatible with the public interest at that time. (Tr., p.37,
L.25 - p.40, L.5, p.41, L.14 - p.42, L.13; R, vol. II, pp.280-87.)
Guess filed a notice of appeal timely both from the district court's
December 23, 2011 order denying his "Motion To Dismiss Withheld Judgment,"
and from the court's February 12, 2012 order denying his Motion To Enforce
Rule 11 Plea Agreement. (R, vol. II, pp.273-77.)
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ISSUES
Guess' issue statement is set forth at page nine (9) of his Appellant's brief
and, due to its length, is not repeated here. The state rephrases the issues on
appeal as:
1.

Has Guess failed to establish either a breach of the plea agreement or a
violation of his due process rights resulting from the district court's orders
denying his motions for I.C. § 19-2604(1) relief?

2.

Has Guess failed to establish that the district court otherwise abused its
discretion in denying his motions for I.C. § 19-2604(1) relief?

3.

Has Guess failed to establish that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
deny his motions for I.C. § 19-2604(1) relief?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Guess Has Failed To Establish Either A Breach Of The Plea Agreement Or A
Violation Of His Due Process Rights Resulting From The District Court's Orders
Denying His Motions For I.C. § 19-2604(1) Relief
A.

Introduction
Guess argues that, by denying his motions for I.C. § 19-2604(1) relief, the

district court breached the Rule 11 plea agreement and violated his due process
rights. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-28, 40-41.) Guess' arguments fail. The language
of the plea agreement is plain and unambiguous and nothing therein required the
district court to grant Guess the requested relief. Because the ultimate dismissal
of his case pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1) was never a term of the plea
agreement, Guess has failed to show either a breach of the plea agreement or a
resulting violation of his due process rights.

B.

Standard Of Review
Plea agreements are contractual in nature. State v. Lutes, 141 Idaho 911,

914, 120 P.3d 299, 302 (Ct. App. 2005).

Therefore, as with other types of

contracts, the interpretation and legal effect of a clear and unambiguous plea
agreement are matters of law reviewed de novo.

kl

Likewise, "whether a plea

agreement has been breached is a question of law to be reviewed by [the
appellate court] de novo, in accordance with contract law standards." State v.
Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, _,281 P.3d 90, 92 (2012) (quoting State v. Peterson,
148 Idaho 593,595,226 P.3d 535, 537 (2010)); accord State v. Jafek 141 Idaho
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71, 73, 106 P.3d 397, 399 (2005); State v. Schultz, 150 Idaho 97, 99, 244 P.3d
241,243 (Ct. App. 2010).
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues,
including claimed due process violations, is one of deference to factual findings,
unless they are clearly erroneous, but free review of whether constitutional
requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Decker, 152
Idaho 142, _ , 267 P.3d 729, 734 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Jacobson, 150
Idaho 131,134,244 P.3d 630, 633 (Ct. App. 2010). "It is the defendant's burden
to demonstrate facts that constitute a due process violation." Decker, 152 Idaho
at _ , 267 P.3d at 734 (citing Jacobson, 150 Idaho at 134, 244 P.3d at 633;
State v. Cantrell, 139 Idaho 409, 412, 80 P.3d 345, 348 (Ct. App. 2003)).

C.

The Plea Agreement Is Plain And Unambiguous And Nothing Therein
Required The District Court To Grant Guess' Motions For I.C. § 192604(1) Relief
When a defendant has entered a guilty plea in reliance upon a plea

agreement with the state, the state is bound to honor the letter of the agreement
and is also bound to behave consistently with the terms of the agreement.
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho
253, _ , 281 P.3d 90, 92 (2012); State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 595, 226
P.3d 535, 537 (2010); State v. Lutes, 141 Idaho 911, 914, 120 P.3d 299, 302
(Ct. App. 2005). Where, as here, a district court accepts without qualification
what is intended by the parties to be a binding Rule 11 plea agreement, the
court, as well as the prosecution and defendant, is bound by the terms of the
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agreement. State v. Horkley, 125 Idaho 860, 865, 876 P.2d 142, 147 (Ct. App.
1994); United States v. Ritsema, 89 F.3d 392, 401

(ih Cir.

1996).

The principle that the state and court (in the case of a binding plea
agreement) must honor the terms of a plea agreement "is derived from the Due
Process Clause and the fundamental rule that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be
both voluntary and intelligent." State v. Halbesleben, 147 Idaho 161, 165, 206
P.3d 867, 871 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 405, 508-09
(1984); State v. Rutherford, 107 Idaho 910,913,693 P.2d 1112,1115 (Ct. App.
1985)).

If the prosecution or court breaches one or more terms of the

agreement, "it cannot be said that the defendant's plea was knowing and
voluntary, for the defendant has been led to plead guilty on a false premise" 1.9.:.
(citing State v. Jones, 139 Idaho 299, 301-02, 77 P.3d 988, 990-91 (Ct. App.
2003)); see also Gomez, 153 Idaho at _ , 281 P.3d at 93 ("[A] claim that the
State breached a plea agreement affects whether the agreement was knowingly
or voluntarily entered .... "); but see Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 13738 (2009) (,,[T]here is nothing to support the proposition that the government's
breach of a plea agreement retroactively causes the defendant's agreement to
have been unknowing or involuntary.").

The defendant, however, bears the

burden of proving a breach. Gomez, 153 Idaho at _,281 P.3d at 94.
In determining whether a plea agreement has been breached, the
appellate court must examine the language of the agreement at issue.

lit (citing

Peterson, 148 Idaho at 595, 226 P.3d at 537. If the language of the agreement
is ambiguous, the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the defendant.
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lit

If,

on the other hand, the language of a written plea agreement is unambiguous i.e., not reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations - the court "will not look

beyond the four corners of the agreement to determine the intent of the parties."

kL. (citing Beus v. Beus, 151 Idaho 235, 241, 254 P.3d 1231,1237 (2011)).
The language of the plea agreement in this case is unambiguous.
Paragraph two (2) of the written agreement provides in relevant part:
2.

That the State and the Defendant agree that the appropriate
disposition of this matter is as follows:
That the Defendant shall receive a Withheld Judgment and
shall be placed on probation to the Idaho State Department
of Corrections for a period of no more than five (5) years.
[Agreed upon terms of probation omitted.]

(R., vol. I, p.53.)

Pursuant to the plain and unambiguous language of this

provision, the trial court's only obligation upon accepting the plea agreement was
to withhold judgment and place Guess on probation for no more than five years,
which the trial court did. (See R., vol. I, pp.103-11 (order withholding judgment
and placing Guess on probation for five years).) Nothing in the plain language of
the agreement imposed upon the court an additional obligation to ultimately
dismiss the case pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1) upon Guess' satisfactory
completion of probation.
On appeal, Guess acknowledges that the written plea agreement is silent
with respect to when, if ever, his guilty plea would be set aside pursuant to I.C. §
19-2604(1).

(Appellant's brief, pp.18, 21-22.)

He argues, however, that the

absence of any express provision allowing for I.C. § 19-2604(1) relief renders the
plea agreement ambiguous and, as such, the agreement must be construed in
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his favor.

(See Appellant's brief, p.18 ("[T]he Rule 11 Plea Agreement is

ambiguous because it is vague and indefinite as to when Charles' guilty plea
would be set aside. As such, the Rule 11 Plea Agreement must be construed in
Charles' favor and it is 'implied by the plea agreement' that his guilty plea would
be set aside upon completing probation."); pp.21-22 ("Since the district court and
State both assert that the Rule 11 Plea Agreement does not specifically state
when Charles' guilty plea would be set aside ... , the State must bear the
responsibility for that lack of clarity.").) Guess' attempt to equate silence with
ambiguity and to have this Court read into the written agreement a provision that
simply is not there is directly foreclosed by the Idaho Supreme Court's recent
opinion in State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 281 P.3d 90 (2012).
The defendant in Gomez pled guilty to three drug-related felonies.
-'

281 P.3d at 91-92.

19.:. at

The written plea agreement called for specific

sentencing recommendations but was silent with respect to restitution.

19.:.

at

_ , 281 P.3d at 94. The district court imposed the agreed upon sentences and,
at the state's request, also ordered Gomez to pay more than $129,000 in
restitution related to the costs of investigation.

19.:. at _ ,

281 P.3d at 92. On

appeal, Gomez argued that, because restitution was not mentioned in the plea
agreement, the state's request for restitution and the issuance of the restitution
order constituted a breach of that agreement.

19.:.

The Idaho Supreme Court

disagreed, ultimately concluding that, because the plain and unambiguous
language of the written plea agreement was "silent as to the costs of restitution
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or whether restitution would be sought," there was no agreement as to restitution
and, as such, no breach.

kl at _ ,

281 P.3d at 94-95. The Court explained:

The parties could have included restitution in the written plea
agreement if they wanted the agreement to contemplate the issue.
When viewing the document within its four corners, the restitution
order did not breach the contract as the issue was not
contemplated in the plea agreement. Since the contract is clear
and unambiguous, it is unnecessary for this Court to analyze any
extrinsic evidence or to look at the intent of the parties.

kl at _,281

P.3d at 95.

The reasoning of Gomez applies equally in this case and compels the
conclusion that the district court did not violate binding Rule 11 plea agreement
by declining to order an I.C. § 19-2604(1) dismissal after Guess satisfactorily
completed his probation.

The written plea agreement calls for a specific

sentencing disposition - i.e., a withheld judgment and no more than five years of
probation - but is silent with respect to when, and whether, Guess would ever be
entitled to dismissal of the case pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1). Because the plain
and unambiguous language of the plea agreement does not even contemplate
the issue of an I.C. § 19-2604(1) dismissal, the district court could not, and did
not, breach the agreement by denying Guess' motions for I.C. § 19-2604(1)
relief. Gomez, 153 Idaho at _,281 P.3d at 95. See also Lutes, 141 Idaho at
914-15, 120 P.3d at 302-03 (where plea agreement called for period of retained
jurisdiction but was silent as to whether defendant would be placed on probation
at end of retained jurisdiction period, trial court did not breach agreement by
relinquishing jurisdiction).

10

Contrary to Guess' assertions (see Appellant's brief, pp.18-21, 24-28), this
is not a case like State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 226 P.3d 535 (2010), where
the state was bound by the defendant's understanding of the plea agreement
because the prosecutor stood silent in the face of the defense's representation
at the change of plea hearing regarding the meaning of an ambiguous term.
Unlike the plea agreement at issue in Peterson, the plea agreement in this case
is reduced to writing and unambiguously sets forth the state's and court's
obligations with respect to the appropriate sentencing disposition, with no
mention whatsoever of an eventual dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1).
There being no ambiguity in the written plea agreement, it is the four corners of
that agreement, not Guess' "reasonable understanding," that controls.

See

Gomez, 153 Idaho at _ , 281 P.3d at 94-95 (distinguishing Peterson on basis
that the plea agreement in that case was ambiguous and concluding: "Since the
contract [in Gomez] is clear and unambiguous, it is unnecessary for this Court to
analyze any extrinsic evidence or to look at the intent of the parties.").
Even assuming evidence of Guess' "reasonable understanding" were at
all relevant to interpretation of the unambiguous plea agreement, a review of
Guess' statements at the change of plea hearing shows he understood that the
term "withheld judgment," as used in the plea agreement, meant only that he
could eventually petition for relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1), not that such
relief would automatically be granted:
THE COURT:
And do you understand that the
agreement contemplates that you would receive a withheld
judgment as a result of pleading guilty to this charge?

11

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT:
judgment" means?

Do

you

know

what

a

"withheld

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT:
Why don't you explain to me what
you're [sic] understanding is.
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I mean that - I guess, I'd explain
that - my understanding of the entire agreement is that I - that I
am pleading guilty to this charge and that I will spend - my
punishment will include 30 days in incarceration in the Latah
County jail. I will pay a $1,000 fine. And I'm pleading guilty to one
of the - one of the felony charges. I'll have a year period of
probation, and if I fulfill the period of probation without any
problems in that period of time, that the felony charges would would be dropped.
[Clarification by defense counsel that the period of probation
would be determined by the court.]
THE COURT:
Well, Mr. Guess, the - I think you
understand what a withheld judgment means. It means that if you
comply with your terms and conditions of probation that at the
conclusion of the period of probation, which is for a period of no
more than five years, according to the agreement, that you could
come in and petition to have your guilty plea, which you
tendered today, withdrawn and the charge against you
dismissed. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: I do, yes.
(Tr., p.??, L.5 - p.?S, L.16 (emphasis added).) The above colloquy shows that,
to the extent Guess believed the plea agreement calling for a withheld judgment
meant the "felony charges would ... be dropped" upon his successful completion
of probation, such misconception was expressly corrected by the district court
who advised Guess that he could petition to have his guilty plea withdrawn and
the case dismissed. Guess specifically acknowledged understanding the effect
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of the withheld judgment, as contemplated by the plea agreement and explained
by the district court. Guess' claim, both in his motions for I.C. § 19-2604(1) relief
and on appeal, that he reasonably understood the plea agreement to provide for
the automatic dismissal of the case upon his successful completion of probation
is thus belied by his own statements at the time he actually entered his plea.
Guess has failed to show that the court breached the plea agreement or acted
contrary to his understanding thereof, as expressed during the plea colloquy, by
declining to grant his motions for I.C. § 19-2604(1) relief.1

In addition to arguing a breach of the plea agreement, Guess argues that
the district court's and state's interpretation of the plea agreement as not
requiring an automatic dismissal of the case upon Guess' successful completion
of probation is "contrary to the legislature's intent for authorizing withheld
judgments." (Appellant's brief, p.16.) According to Guess, the case law
interpreting Idaho Code §§ 19-2601 (3) and 19-2604(1) "implicitly hold[s] that a
court has no discretion to deny a request to set aside a guilty plea upon a
defendant's compliance with the terms of probation and sentence under a
withheld judgment." (ld. at 16-17; see also pp.40-41 ("Once the Court accepted
the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, entered the resulting Order Withholding Judgment
and Charles complied with the required sentence and probation, the remaining
issue is purely the procedural step of setting aside his guilty plea and restoring
his civil rights." (emphasis original)).) This argument is frivolous.
Idaho Code § 19-2603(1) gives the court discretion to withhold judgment
"on such terms and for such time" as the court may prescribe. Idaho Code § 192604(1) provides that a court "may" thereafter set aside the defendant's plea and
finally dismiss the case if two conditions are met: there have been no
adjudicated probation violations and dismissal of the case is "compatible with the
public interest." Neither of the authorities Guess cites stand for the proposition
that a court must dismiss a case pursuant to I. C. § 19-2604( 1) upon a showing
by the defendant that he has satisfactorily complied with the conditions of
probation. Rather, the cases merely state that a trial court may not indefinitely
withhold judgment, Ex parte Medley, 73 Idaho 474, 483-84, 253 P.2d 794, 800
(1953), and that the satisfactory completion of probation is a condition that must
be met before the district court can exercise its discretion to dismiss a case in
which a withheld judgment has previously been entered, State v. Hanes, 139
Idaho 392, 394, 79 P.3d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 2003).
13

The written Rule 11 plea agreement is unambiguous. Because nothing
therein contemplates the automatic dismissal of the case pursuant to I.C. § 192604(1) upon Guess' successful completion of probation, the district court did
not breach the agreement by denying Guess' I.C. § 19-2604(1) motions. Having
failed to show any breach, Guess has also failed to show any resulting violation
of his due process rights. The district court's order denying Guess' Motion To
Enforce Rule 11 Plea Agreement must be affirmed.

II.
Guess Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Otherwise
Abused Its Discretion In Denying His Motions For I.C. § 19-2604(1) Relief
Based On Its Determination That The Requested Relief Was
Not Compatible With The Public Interest

A.

Introduction
The district court denied Guess' "Motion To Dismiss Withheld Judgment,"

and his subsequent motion for clarification, based on its determination that a
dismissal of the case was not yet "compatible with the public interest," as
required by I.C. § 19-2604(1). Specifically, the court found that, while Guess had
been an exemplary probationer, the nature of Guess' crime and the victim's
continuing fear countenanced against an I.C. § 19-2604(1) dismissal and the
resulting restoration of Guess' civil rights at that time.

(R., vol. II, pp.212-13,

284-86; Tr., p.56, L.19 - p.57, L.15, p.38, L.7 - p.40, L.5, p.41, L.14 - p.42,
L.13.) Guess challenges the district court's rulings on a number of bases, none
of which show an abuse of discretion in the denial, without prejudice, of his
motions for I.C. § 19-2604(1) relief.
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B.

Standard Of Review
The decision to grant or deny motion made pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1)

"rest[s] in the sound discretion of the district court." Housley v. State, 119 Idaho
885, 890, 811 P.2d 495, 500 (Ct. App. 1991). When a trial court's discretionary
decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered
inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as
one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the bounds of such
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific
choices before it; and (3) whether the lower reached its decision by an exercise
of reason. State v. Ruperd, 146 Idaho 742,743,202 P.3d 1228, 1289 (Ct. App.
2009) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989».

C.

Guess Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion In The District Court's
Determination That An I.C. § 19-2604(1) Dismissal Was Not Compatible
With The Public Interest
Guess sought relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1), which provides in

relevant part:
(1) If sentence has been imposed but suspended, or if sentence
has been withheld, upon application of the defendant and upon
satisfactory showing that:
(a) The court did not find, and the defendant did not admit,
in any probation violation proceeding that the defendant
violated any of the terms or conditions of probation ...
the court may, if convinced by the showing made that there is no
longer cause for continuing the period of probation, and if it be
compatible with the public interest, terminate the sentence or set
aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant, and finally
dismiss the case and discharge the defendant .... The final
dismissal of the case as herein provided shall have the effect of
restoring the defendant to his civil rights.
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I.C. § 19-2604(1) (as amended by 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 187, § 1).2

Pursuant to the plain language of this statute, a district court may exercise its
discretion to set aside a guilty plea and finally dismiss a case in which a withheld
judgment was previously entered only when (1) the defendant has no
adjudicated probation violations, and (2) doing so is "compatible with the public
interest."
In support of his motion for an I.C. § 19-2604(1) dismissal, Guess
submitted his own affidavit, which detailed his success on probation (R., vol. II,
pp.176-77), as well as 14 letters of support (R., vol. II, pp.179-209), including a
letter from his former psychologist who opined that Guess no longer posed a
threat to his ex-wife (R, vol. II, pp.182-83).

The district court specifically

considered these materials and the fact that Guess had "performed as well as
any defendant [the court could] remember while on probation." (Tr., p.56, Ls.1924.) "On the other side of the scale," however, the court also considered the
"abominable behavior which resulted in" Guess' guilty plea and the fact that the
victim, Michele Guess, stated at the hearing on Guess' motion that she still
feared Guess. (Tr., p.56, L.25 - p.57, L.4.) Specifically, Michele stated:
You know, I believe in resolution. But I also believe that I have my
rights, too, as a victim. And the law is the law. And I believe that
your decision will be honored.

2 Before the 2011 amendment, I.C. § 19-2604(1) required as a prerequisite to
the setting aside of a guilty plea and final dismissal of the case a "satisfactory
showing that the defendant [had] at all times complied with the terms and
conditions upon which he was placed on probation."
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I do wish to continue my relationship with my son. And I
would also like to tell you that I still have some fear. I will never
probably resolve that and neither will my immediate family.
So, it's your decision, Judge. And I have written a letter to
you in the very beginning telling you my feelings about my position.
And to this point, you know, I, as a victim, will always be in fear of
Mr. Guess. So, it's your decision, Judge. And thank you for letting
me speak.
(Tr., p.55, Ls.11-24.) After balancing Michele's expressed fear and the nature of
the crime against the fact that Guess had performed well on probation and had
numerous letters of support, the district court denied Guess' motion without
prejudice. (Tr., p.56, L.19-p.57, L.15; R., vol. II, pp.212-14.)
Guess subsequently moved for "clarification" of the district court's order.
(R., vol. II, pp.218-59.)

The district court treated the motion as one for

reconsideration and denied it without prejudice, explaining:
There's a lot of water under the bridge here, and I think to
get back to my earlier observation, this is a dynamic process. And
in order for me to restore Mr. Guess's rights I have to find that it is
compatible with the public interest, and I have to do that now as
opposed to when I entered the withheld judgment.
That isn't to say that I will never grant the relief requested by
Mr. Guess, it's that at this juncture I'm unprepared to do so. So, to
the extent that it's a motion to reconsider, I'm denying that, as well,
but I'm denying that without prejudice.
I think there will come a time when Mr. Guess's rights will be
restored. I can't tell you when that time will be, but I think given the
showing that I have seen, given the contrition that I have seen,
given the rehabilitation that I have seen, I think Mr. Guess is on the
right track as far as having me grant the relief that he requests.

I can tell you I haven't ever seen the showing that was made
by [defense counsel] at the last hearing as it relates to someone's
rehabilitation. Mr. Guess is clearly contrite. He's remorseful. He
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has done all that he can do in order to be awarded the relief that he
seeks today. But I think there's a twofold determination. Not only
must I determine that he has done everything that he can do, but
that it would be compatible with public interest.
I'm not saying that Michele Guess's acquiescence in this
request is what needs to occur. I can tell you that if she had no
objection, I would grant it, though. But at some point I may
conclude that that acquiescence will never be forthcoming and that
it is yet compatible with the public interest to grant Mr. Guess the
relief he requests.

This is a tough case. I don't think there's any doubt about it.
But I don't think the Rule 11 Agreement obligates me to grant him
the relief he requests even if he did everything that was required of
him. I think I still must make an independent determination that
granting the relief requested is compatible with public interest, and
I'm not quite there yet.
(Tr., p.38, L.7 - pAD, L.5; see also R., vol. II, pp.28D-87 (written order denying
motion).)

In response to a request for clarification by defense counsel, the

district court further elucidated the basis of its ruling, ultimately explaining: "[M]y
hesitancy is based on the compatibility with the public interest, and Michele
Guess as a victim of this offense, carries no small amount of voice in that." (Tr.,
pA1, L.14 - pA2, L.13.)
On appeal, Guess does not contend that the district court failed to
recognize the issue before it as one of discretion.

Rather, he contends,

variously, that the district court misapplied the law, made erroneous factual
findings and, ultimately, had no discretion to deny the requested relief under the
facts as Guess perceives them. (See generally Appellant's brief, pp.28-38.) For
the reasons that follow, all of Guess' arguments are unavailing and fail to show
any abuse of discretion by the district court.
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Guess' first claim of error centers on his assertion that, by withholding
judgment in the first place, the district court "must have implicitly found it to be
'compatible with the public interest'" and, as such, was somehow precluded from
making a contrary finding in relation to Guess' subsequently filed motions for I.C.

§ 19-2604(1) relief. (Appellant's brief, pp.29-30; see also Appellant's brief, p.34
(arguing that "the district court and State are collaterally estopped" from relying
on victim's fear in "compatible with the public interest" analysis because court
and state were aware when Guess entered his plea and received a withheld
judgment that victim feared him).) Guess is incorrect. The district court's finding
at the guilty plea and sentencing stages of the proceedings that "the interests of
justice would best be served" by withholding judgment and placing Guess on
probation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601(3) (see R., vol. I, p.104) was, in effect,
nothing more than a finding that Guess should have the opportunity to avoid the
stigma of a criminal conviction and to someday have his case dismissed and his
civil rights restored. I.C. § 19-2604(1) (where sentence has been withheld, court
may set aside plea, dismiss case and discharge defendant upon defendant's
application); Ex parte Medley, 73 Idaho 474, 479, 253 P.2d 794, 797 (1953)

(when court withholds judgment it "creates ... a hope in the heart of the accused
that he may ultimately be released under an order of probation without the
stigma of a judgment of conviction" (emphasis added».

That was an entirely

different finding than the one the court was required to make in relation to Guess'
motion for dismissal - i.e., whether it was "compatible with the public interest" to
ultimately

grant

the

requested

relief
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that

would

have

the

effect

of actually restoring Guess' civil rights. 3 Guess' claim that the district court's
decision to withhold judgment in the first place somehow bound it to grant his
subsequent motion for dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1) is meritless.
Guess next argues that, because he "complied with probation and better
than 'any defendant [the district court could] remember while on probation' ... ,
the plain and rationale [sic] meaning of I.C. § 19-2604(1), interpreted to not
render an absurd result, dictates that the district court had no discretion to deny
relief."
omitted).)

(Appellant's brief, p.30 (brackets and emphasis original) (citations
This argument is also meritless.

By its plain language, I.C. § 19-

2604(1) requires a defendant seeking dismissal of his case to show both that he
has no adjudicated probation violations and that the requested dismissal is
"compatible with the public interest." If the legislature had intended to grant trial
courts the authority to set aside a defendant's plea and finally dismiss a case
merely upon a showing that the defendant complied with probation, it easily

Although I.C. § 19-2604(1) contains no limitation on the civil rights that are
restored to a defendant upon final dismissal of the case, there was some debate
among the parties below as to whether, in the event Guess' case was dismissed,
his right to possess firearms would nevertheless be limited by virtue of I.C. § 18310. (See R., vol. II, pp.262, 269-72; Tr., p.17, L.21 - p.18, L.25, p.30, Ls.8-21.)
The state maintains, as it did below, that the I.C. § 18-310(3) provides the
exclusive method by which Guess' gun rights may be restored. However,
because the district court did not grant Guess' requests for an I.C. § 19-2604(1)
dismissal and, therefore, did not purport either to fully restore or to limit the
restoration of Guess' civil rights, Guess' claim on appeal that the court erred by
"refus[ing] to restore" his gun rights (Appellant's brief, pp.41-45) is not properly
before this Court. See State v. Huntsman, 146 Idaho 580,585, 199 P.3d 155,
160 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Grube, 126 Idaho 377,387,883 P.2d 1069, 1079
(1994) (citing State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481, 485, 849 P.2d 942, 946 (1993);
Dunlick, Inc. v. Utah-Idaho Concrete Pipe Co., 77 Idaho 499, 502, 295 P.2d 700,
702 (1956)) ("in order for an issue to be raised on appeal, the record must reveal
an adverse ruling which forms the basis for an assignment of error").
3
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could have done so.

The fact that legislature required, as an additional

consideration, that the dismissal also be "compatible with the public interest"
shows the legislature's intent that success on probation and compatibility with
the public interest are not always synonymous. Indeed, the district court found
that the two were not synonymous in this case. Guess' argument that he was
entitled to relief merely because he was an exemplary probationer utterly ignores
the "compatible with the public interest" requirement of I.C. § 19-2604(1) and
shows no abuse of discretion by the district court.
Next, Guess argues that the district court "misapplied the law when it
determined that a victim's 'fear' supported a finding that it was not 'compatible
with the public interest''' to set aside Guess' plea to aggravated assault and
finally dismiss the case. (Appellant's brief, p.30.) According to Guess, because
the words "victim" and "fear" do not expressly appear in either I.C. §§ 19-2601 (3)
(statute authorizing withheld judgment) or 19-2604(1), the fact that a victim is
fearful and/or objects to the defendant's request for dismissal is not relevant and
may not be considered by the court in determining whether the requested
dismissal is "compatible with the public interest." (Appellant's brief, pp.30-32.)
Guess' interpretation of the term "public interest," as it is used in the statute, is
unduly restrictive and ignores the fact that victims' rights are a matter of public
interest under Idaho law. See Idaho Const., art. I, § 22 (enumerating rights of
crime victims, including rights to "fairness, respect, dignity and privacy
throughout the criminal justice process," to "timely disposition of the case," to
notice of court proceedings, to "be present at all criminal justice proceedings,"
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and to "be heard, upon request, at all criminal justice proceedings considering a
plea of guilty, sentencing, incarceration or release of the defendant, unless
manifest injustice would result"); I.C. § 19-5306 (same). In a case such as this,
where the granting of relief would result in the setting aside of a defendant's
guilty plea to a violent crime, a dismissal of the case and a restoration of the
defendant's rights (including, at least potentially, the right to possess firearms),
there can be no serious question that the public has an interest in the victim's
safety and sense of well-being.
Guess argues that interpreting the "compatible with public interest"
requirement of I.C. § 19-2604(1) to include consideration of the victim's fear
"would empower the Judge and the victim with unlimited discretion" to deny a
defendant I.C. § 19-2604(1) relief, even where such relief is otherwise
appropriate. (Appellant's brief, p.32.) The state disagrees. As recognized by
the district court in this case, a victim's continuing fear of a defendant is one of
many considerations that must be balanced in determining whether to grant the
defendant's request for I.C. § 19-2604(1) relief. (See Tr., p.39, LS.15-20 ("I'm
not saying that Michele Guess's acquiescence in this request is what needs to
occur. ... [A]t some point I may conclude that that acquiescence will never be
forthcoming and that it is yet compatible with the public interest to grant Mr.
Guess the relief he requests."); R, pp.285-86 (,'The determination that Guess
should be granted relief under I.C. § 19-2604(1) is not entirely dependent on
Michele's acquiescence. Such acquiescence may never occur. Nonetheless,
this Court is unwilling to disregard her fear of the Defendant and her objection to
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him being granted relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1), at this time.").) That the
court considered the victim's continuing fear of Guess in determining whether the
requested relief was yet "compatible with the public interest" in this case does
not, by itself, show an abuse of discretion.
Guess next argues that the district court's findings that the victim still
feared Guess and objected to his request for an I.C. § 19-2604(1) dismissal are
not supported by any evidence. (Appellant's brief, pp.32-3S.) This argument is
patently meritless.

Michele appeared telephonically at the hearing on Guess'

motion to dismiss and explicitly stated that she "still [had] some fear" and that,
"as a victim, will always be in fear of Mr. Guess." (Tr., p.55, Ls.17-23.) Although
Michele never used the word "object," she did ask the court to consider her
"rights ... as a victim," the law, her continued fear of Guess, and her "feelings
about [her] position" as expressed in a letter she wrote to the court at the time of
sentencing.

4

(Tr., p.55, Ls.11-24.) It is thus clear from the context of Michele's

comments that, while she would "honor[]" any decision the court made, she
opposed Guess' motion for dismissal and an accompanying restoration of his
civil rights. (ld.) Guess has failed to show clear error in the district court's factual

In the letter she wrote for purposes of sentencing, Michele described her
feelings toward Guess as those of "unbelievable terror," and she asked the court
to "take into consideration the respect of [her] worth as an individual" and to
impose a "strong" sentence that would ensure Guess would never again harm
her or any other person. (Tr., p.106, Ls.14-16, p.107, L.10 - p.10S, L.1S.)
Michele reiterated those sentiments in her interview with the presentence
investigator (PSI, pp.4-7) and specifically expressed in that interview her fear
that, after Guess' probation term ended, he would be allowed to possess
weapons again. (PSI, p.6).
4
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findings that Michele still feared Guess and objected to his motion for I.C. § 192604(1) relief.
Finally, Guess argues that the district court erred in relying on Michele's
fear as the basis not to set aside Guess' guilty plea, dismiss the case and restore
his civil rights because, according to Guess, there were no facts or evidence to
support a finding that Michele's continued fear was objectively reasonable.
(Appellant's brief, pp.33, 36-38.) To support this claim, Guess points to the facts
that he was a model probationer, never violated the order that prohibited him
from having contact with Michele, was cordial to Michele during their divorce
proceedings, and had numerous letters of support, including one from his former
psychologist who opined that Guess no longer posed a threat to Michele. (ld.)
The state does not concede that, as a matter of law, the district court was
required to find Michele's fear objectively reasonable before it could rely on it as
a basis to conclude that dismissal of Guess' case was not yet compatible with
the public interest, nor has Guess cited any authority that stands for such
proposition.

(See Appellant's brief, p.36 (citing standard for self-defense).)

Assuming for purposes of argument that an objectively reasonable fear is the
standard, however, there was plenty of evidence before the court to support the
conclusion that Michele's continued fear of Guess was objectively reasonable in
this case.
By his own admission, the restoration of his right to possess firearms was
one of the primary reasons Guess sought dismissal of his case. 5 (Appellant's

5

See footnote 3, infra.
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brief, p.2 n.1; R., vol. II, pp.245-56; Tr., p.18, Ls.7-12, p.34, L.16 - p.35, L.12.)
Yet, just five years earlier, while embroiled in a bitter divorce dispute with
Michele, Guess followed Michele and her divorce attorney to an open vault in the
basement of his home and, while their backs were turned, "he produced a .40
caliber Glock pistol and moved the slide to indicate a bullet had been advanced
into the gun's barrel." (R., vol. II, p.281; PSI, pp.2-4, 7-8.) When Michele and
her attorney turned around, Guess was pointing the gun at them and threatened
to kill both of them.

(R., vol. II, p.281; PSI, pp.3-4,8.) Michele moved toward

Guess and Guess twice struck her in the face with his fist. (R., vol. II, p.281;

PSI, pp.3, 8.)

He also ordered Michele's attorney to walk into the vault and

remove his pants. (PSI, pp.3-4.) While Michele and her attorney were ultimately
able to escape the home without being shot, Michele feared throughout the
ordeal that Guess was going to shoot her and then shoot himself. (PSI, pp.3-5.)
Even assuming the district court was required to find that Michele's
continued fear of Guess was objectively reasonable, the above facts, specifically
considered by the district court in relation to Guess' motions to dismiss (Tr., p.56,
L.25 - p.57, L.4; R., vol. II, p.281), support such a finding.

There can be no

question that an objectively reasonable person, having been held at gunpoint
and battered by her estranged husband, would continue to fear her assailant five
years later, particularly when he is specifically seeking to have his right to
possess firearms restored.

Given the victim's objectively reasonable fear, the

relatively close proximity of the crime to Guess' motion, and the fact that the
underlying crime involved a firearm, it was entirely reasonable for the district
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court to conclude that the setting aside of Guess' guilty plea and dismissal of his
case at this early date was not yet "compatible with the public interest" as
required by I.C. § 19-2604(1). Guess has failed to show an abuse of discretion
in the denial, without prejudice, of his motions for I.C. § 19-2604(1) relief.

III.
Guess Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Exceeded Its Jurisdiction
By Denying His Motions For I.C. § 19-2604(1) Relief
A.

Introduction
Guess argues that, by denying his motions to dismiss his case pursuant to

I.C. § 19-2604(1), the district court "unilaterally and indefinitely" extended his
withheld judgment and probationary period beyond the five-year maximum
sentence for aggravated assault, thereby exceeding its jurisdiction. (Appellant's
brief, pp.38-40.) Guess' argument fails. That the district court declined to set
aside Guess' plea and dismiss his case pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1) did not
extend the withheld judgment, which by its own terms lapsed after five years.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law that may be raised

at any time, and over which appellate courts exercise free review."

State v.

Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004). The appellate court also
freely reviews the construction and application of a statute. State v. Shock, 133
Idaho 753, 755, 992 P.2d 202, 204 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Schumacher, 131
Idaho 484,485,959 P.2d 465, 466 (Ct. App. 1998).
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c.

The District Court Did Not Exceed Its Jurisdiction Or Indefinitely Withhold
Judgment By Denying Guess' Motions For I.C. § 19-2604(1) Relief
The power of a court to withhold judgment in a criminal case derives from

I.C. § 19-2601(3), which provides:
Whenever any person shall have been convicted, or enter a
plea of guilty, in any district court of the state of Idaho, of or to any
crime against the laws of the state, except those of treason or
murder, the court in its discretion may:

3. Withhold judgment on such terms and for such time as it may
prescribe and may place the defendant on probation[.]
"If the court grants a withheld judgment to a particular defendant and places that
defendant on probation, jurisdiction is retained by the district court during the
period of probation and the court has continuing jurisdiction to modify the
conditions of the defendant's probation." State v. Branson, 128 Idaho 790, 792,
919 P.2d 319, 321 (1996) (citing Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 460, 808 P.2d
373,379 (1991)); see also Ex parte Medley, 73 Idaho 474,483,253 P.2d 794,
800 (1953). A court may not, however, withhold judgment indefinitely. Ex parte
Medley, 73 Idaho at 483-84, 253 P.3d at 800.

If it does so, "it has, for all

practical purposes, lost jurisdiction to proceed further."

~

(citation omitted).

After Guess pled guilty to aggravated assault, the district court, acting
pursuant to its authority under I.C. § 19-2601 (3), entered an order withholding
judgment and placing him on probation for five years. (R., vol. l,pp.103-11.) The
order was file stamped September 6, 2006, and was dated "nunc pro tunc to
August 31, 2006," by the district judge. (R., vol. I, pp.103, 110.) Assuming for
purposes of argument the "nunc pro tunc" date controls, the withheld judgment
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expired, by its own terms, on August 31, 2011.

6

Contrary to Guess' assertions

on appeal, the fact that the district court did not thereafter dismiss the case
pursuant to Guess' motions for I. C. § 19-2604( 1) relief did not extend the
withheld judgment beyond the expiration of its five-year term.
Idaho Code § 19-2604(1) gives the court discretion to set aside a guilty
plea and dismiss a case in which a withheld judgment has been previously
entered. The statute says nothing about dismissing the withheld judgment itself,
and the relief there under is not automatic but is subject to a finding by the court
that the defendant has no adjudicated probation violations and the final dismissal
of the case is "compatible with the public interest."

I.C. § 19-2604(1).

The

district court in this case resolved the "compatible with the public interest"
question in favor of delaying I.C. § 19-2604(1) relief and, in so doing, put Guess
in the same position as any other defendant whose motion for I.C. § 19-2604(1)
relief has been denied or who never made an I. C. § 19-2604(1) motion at all.
The denial of relief did not extend the withheld judgment which, by its terms, is
no longer enforceable against Guess (in the sense that the court cannot enter
judgment), but was a legitimate exercise of the court's discretion to decline to

Because the withheld judgment expired on August 31, 2011, the court had no
jurisdiction beyond that date to enforce the withheld judgment - i.e., it had no
jurisdiction to keep Guess on probation, modify the conditions of probation, or
revoke probation and enter judgment based upon any alleged probation
violation. See Branson, 128 Idaho at 792, 919 P.2d at 321 (if defendant violates
probation within period of withheld judgment, court may revoke probation and
"impose any sentence which originally might have been imposed at the time of
conviction" (citations and internal quotations omitted)). The state thus agrees
with Guess that the court's December 23, 2011 order that purported to finally
discharge Guess from probation (R., vol. II, p.213), when his probation period
had already expired as a matter of law, is void.
6
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dismiss the case in which the order withholding judgment had been entered.
Guess has failed to establish that the district court exceeded its jurisdiction by
denying his I.C. § 19-2604(1) motions.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
orders denying Guess' motions for dismissal of his withheld judgment.
DATED this 1Sth day of September 2012.
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